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Analysis · Political economy

Ghana: what debt restructuring really costs a country

Ghana’s experience shows that reducing public debt transfers part of the cost to banks, savers, creditors and future budgets.

This reading edition faithfully presents the article’s central argument. The complete source text remains available in French.

Transferring the cost to the domestic economy

Ghana’s restructuring after the 2022 crisis was not merely a negotiation with foreign investors. Banks, insurers, pension funds and other domestic institutions held large quantities of government securities. Changing the value, yield or maturity of those securities therefore affected institutions that finance the national economy.

The 2023 domestic debt exchange reduced pressure on the budget, but the cost did not disappear. It moved to bondholders through later maturities and different financial terms. Sovereign debt treatment cannot be reduced to a confrontation between a debtor country and foreign creditors.

Financial stability at the heart of debt treatment

When national banks hold public debt, State difficulties enter their balance sheets. Pension funds transmit part of the adjustment to long-term savings, while exposed insurers may also be weakened. A harsh restructuring can solve a fiscal problem and create a banking or financial one.

The design must therefore consider financial stability, the composition of creditors and the future operation of the bond market. This lesson matters to Senegal even though its economy, currency and membership of a monetary union distinguish it from Ghana.

What Ghana’s experience can teach Senegal

Before a debt is said to be treated, the public should know who will keep the claim, receive less interest, wait longer for repayment and bear the institutional risk. Extending maturities can ease the State’s annual debt service, but it imposes an economic loss on those who expected earlier payment.

Technical terms such as reprofiling, rescheduling and voluntary exchange are useful, but cannot conceal the distributional question: when original conditions can no longer be honoured, someone bears the cost of the new arrangement.

Restructuring is no substitute for fiscal discipline

Ghana’s agreement with external creditors did not end its budgetary difficulties. New expenditure outside ordinary controls later weakened the position again. Restructuring did not relieve the country of the need to govern its public finances.

Senegal must address both the stock of hidden debt and the procedures by which expenditure is authorised, recorded and controlled. A successful restructuring does not simply remove debt from the statistics; it changes public management sufficiently to make another restructuring unnecessary.

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