Mérisphère · International special report
Africa–United States: what remains of the Trump wager after the midterms?
From Kinshasa to Bamako, governments have sought Washington’s diplomatic pressure on a neighbouring state, investment or security cooperation. A change of majority in Congress requires examining what they have secured, what they still await and what actually depends on the US president.

Key points. Converging projections from US news agencies and media show Democrats controlling both houses of Congress following the 3 November election. The new congressional term begins in January 2027. Donald Trump retains the presidency and control of the executive. For African partners, the issue is the division of power in Washington rather than the immediate arrival of a new administration. 1–2
Different countries, different wagers
| Country | Areas sought or discussed | Established developments and outstanding expectations |
|---|---|---|
| DRC | Security in the east, pressure on Rwanda and the M23, critical minerals, infrastructure and energy. | Strategic partnership signed; investment and security improvements must be assessed project by project. |
| Rwanda | Relations with Washington, regional agreements, trade and investment. | Participation in the accords; relations weakened by sanctions and the announced exclusion from AGOA. These facts alone do not establish support for Trump. |
| Mali | Diplomatic normalisation, sanctions, intelligence and action against armed groups. | Dialogue and the lifting of individual sanctions documented; full cooperation arrangements not publicly established. |
| Niger | Renegotiating security cooperation; uranium and technology activities. | US military withdrawal completed in 2024; economic prospects reported, with no evidence of restored bases or full implementation of investments. |
| Burkina Faso | Diplomatic dialogue, counterterrorism cooperation, diversification of partners. | Included in the US regional opening; the cited sources do not establish that a bilateral equipment or training programme has already been delivered. |
| Nigeria | Mining investment, local processing, infrastructure and technical capacity; broader trade and security relations. | Mining framework announced in September; actual investment and results remain distinct from intentions. 3 |
| Gabon, Liberia, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau | Investment, trade, resources and access to US decision-makers. | Meeting of 9 July 2025 confirmed; it establishes neither identical commitments nor collective political alignment. 4–5 |
The DRC awaits the results of its engagement
The strategic partnership of 4 December 2025 links critical minerals, infrastructure and economic development. The International Energy Agency’s account mentions a right of first offer for US investors on certain designated projects, alongside provisions on mineral markets and the Lobito corridor. This preferential right means neither the automatic transfer of all Congolese resources nor guaranteed funding for every project. 6
Kinshasa’s calculation is understandable: turn US interest in copper, cobalt and other minerals into a stronger commitment to regional stability. For Washington, securing supplies and diversifying China-dominated supply chains give the rapprochement strategic value. Interests may converge without producing identical benefits or delivering them at the same pace.
On 6 November, Congolese Economy Minister Daniel Mukoko Samba called for the partnership to be judged on projects, local processing and access to electricity. Reuters reported that steering committee discussions described progress and increased private-sector interest, without announcing a specific new financial commitment. 7
A partnership’s value lies in what it enables partners to build and protect, not only in what they sign.
On 28 October, Washington announced sanctions against Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence and Zigama Credit and Savings Society, accusing them of supporting the M23. The decision applies US pressure to Rwandan actors; its stated grounds remain those of the US administration.8
These sanctions do not guarantee the DRC’s security. Their impact depends on enforcement and the responses they provoke. Financing mining projects and ending violence remain two separate outcomes to secure.
The new Congress can hold the administration accountable and examine appropriations and the terms of public support. The election alone will not give it the power to erase all existing agreements. Kinshasa will need to secure recognition of the partnership’s objectives beyond a personal relationship with Donald Trump.
The United States returns towards the Sahel
The rapprochement with AES countries follows a different history. Regime changes and subsequent breaks in cooperation severely damaged relations with Washington. The US withdrawal from Niger, completed by 15 September 2024 according to AFRICOM, deprived the United States of an important base for regional activities. 9

On 2 February 2026, Nick Checker met Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop in Bamako. APA’s account reported an affirmation of respect for Malian sovereignty and a desire to maintain dialogue. Diop asked that the AES’s new regional architecture be taken into account. The US initiative also concerned Niger and Burkina Faso, but that general orientation does not establish identical agreements in all three countries. 10
Sanctions against Sadio Camara, Alou Boi Diarra and Adama Bagayoko were lifted on 27 February. An OFAC notice in the Federal Register confirms their removal from the US list. The measures had been imposed in connection with Wagner. Their removal changes how these Malian officials are treated without lifting all restrictions on the country. 11
On 9 March, Reuters described negotiations to resume aerial intelligence operations in Mali. The agency could not confirm whether Bamako was preparing authorisation or the timetable. The operations’ resumption therefore remained uncertain.12
Three interests help explain this return: the expansion of groups linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State; economic opportunities, particularly mining; and the US position in a region whose governments maintain other partnerships. Diplomatic isolation can reduce Washington’s ability to observe, negotiate and influence events.
These interests also give Sahel states bargaining opportunities. Their authorities need security, revenue and equipment; Washington seeks access and cooperation. The terms of the exchange, the capabilities each country retains and the benefits for its population will determine its value.
What the AES can expect from Washington
AES countries have grounds to expect a relationship less reliant on isolation: February’s dialogue and the lifting of sanctions provide concrete signs. Respect for their sovereignty, however, does not oblige the United States to finance or equip them.

The first expectation concerns freedom to choose partners. Cooperation with the United States should not automatically be read as abandoning relations with Russia, China or Turkey. Nor does a Russian or Chinese partnership prove that a state has given up dialogue with Washington. Diversification depends on the real ability to negotiate several offers and reject excessive demands in return.
Sahel authorities may seek intelligence, equipment or training without accepting a permanent foreign military presence. The information cited here does not establish a complete delivery programme to the AES. The terms of any cooperation remain to be negotiated.
An AFP report of 9 April mentions prospects in uranium and technology in Niger, naming Global Atomic, Starlink and ATC Niger, as well as the Morila gold project in Mali. These do not form a single US programme. Global Atomic is Canadian, even if US financial interests may participate. Actual funding and implementation remain to be established.13
An anonymous Malian security source quoted in the same report said Washington was seeking exclusivity in an intelligence field already involving Russian and Chinese cooperation. No public text establishes such a clause, still less a general veto over Mali’s partnerships. Access to information and rights to share it would reportedly be central to the negotiations.13
The diversification of partners depends on the freedom of decision their agreements preserve, rather than their number alone.
What the new Congress can change?

The first lever is budgetary. Congress can determine appropriations, specify their use, require notifications and request reports. A presidential promise to an African government that depends on public funding may face additional scrutiny. A change of majority does not automatically restore cancelled aid appropriations or guarantee the rebuilding of a dismantled administrative system.
The second is executive oversight. Committees can hold hearings, request documents and examine how a partnership is being implemented. The Senate also considers appointments requiring its consent. These powers can make commitments more visible, but you cannot presume they will be used in an African state’s favour. Newly elected members will have their own priorities, differences and trade-offs.
The third concerns trade. AGOA provides an immediate example. On 2 November, the US Trade Representative announced that Donald Trump had notified his intention to remove South Africa and Rwanda from the programme from 1 January 2027. Washington invokes eligibility criteria and accuses both governments of practices contrary to US commercial and strategic interests. These are the official US grounds.16
The announcement does not close US markets to them entirely. It concerns a preferential regime and may make some trade more expensive. Access granted unilaterally remains open to revision. Businesses organising production on that basis need stability that personal relationships at the top cannot guarantee.
Congress can amend the legal framework for trade and the powers delegated to the executive. A new majority does not in itself cancel a presidential notification. The announced effective date, before the new congressional terms begin, also makes timing important. Pretoria and Kigali’s approaches to the administration and Congress serve different functions.
Migration is a fourth area. African states and diasporas may hope for closer scrutiny of some decisions without assuming a general easing of visas, deportations or entry conditions. Legislation, administrative implementation and judicial remedies remain distinct. Democratic control of Congress does not immediately replace one migration policy with another.
US interest in critical minerals extends beyond Donald Trump. Bipartisan congressional initiatives demonstrated this again in autumn 2026. The change in majority therefore does not mean the Congolese partnership or economic dialogue with Nigeria will be abandoned. It may change oversight, budget priorities and the requirements attached to some support. 17
The AES may face sharper debate over military governments or conditions on assistance. The outcome is unknown. Regional security and the US desire to retain interlocutors may also sustain the rapprochement. The understanding sought from Washington will result from negotiations between institutions, interests and constraints; it will not follow automatically from the party controlling a chamber.
Making agreements last beyond individuals
Commitments made with Donald Trump will have to withstand changes of majority, budget decisions and disagreements between US institutions. African states will judge their durability through funding disbursed, cooperation secured and publicly disclosed obligations in return.
Sources
- Associated Press, “Calling control of Congress in the 2026 midterm elections”, 5 November 2026. Projections of control of the chambers, not certification of every result.
- US Senate, Constitution of the United States, Articles I and II and the Twentieth Amendment: legislation, appropriations, appointments and the start of terms. New Congress FAQ.
- Nigerian Ministry of Information, “Nigeria, US Sign Mineral Investment Pact”, September 2026. The date differs between the heading and caption.
- US presidency, remarks before lunch with five African leaders, 9 July 2025, document retained by the Federal Register. A source for statements rather than an assessment of implementation.
- Reuters, “Trump hosts five African leaders as tariffs, aid cuts bite”, 9 July 2025.
- International Energy Agency, “DRC-US Strategic Partnership Agreement”, updated 31 May 2026. Text of the partnership of 4 December 2025, documentary copy.
- Reuters, “Congo says US minerals deal should be judged by projects, not signed deals”, 6 November 2026.
- US Treasury, sanctions against Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence and Zigama, 28 October 2026. Allegations attributed to Washington.
- AFRICOM, “U.S. withdrawal from Niger completed”, September 2024.
- APA, meeting between Nick Checker and Abdoulaye Diop, 3 February 2026, reporting the 2 February meeting.
- OFAC notice in the Federal Register, 3 March 2026, decision of 27 February concerning the three Malian officials among others. Reuters report of 27 February.
- Jessica Donati, Reuters, “US nears deal to resume intelligence operations in Mali”, 9 March 2026. Negotiations reported from US sources; authorisation and timetable unconfirmed in the dispatch.
- AFP, report on the US rapprochement with Sahel countries, 9 April 2026, republished by Courrier international. Alleged intelligence exclusivity comes from an anonymous security source, not an authenticated clause.
- Congressional Research Service, “Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations”, on Section 7008, aid categories and waiver mechanisms. The document alone does not establish each programme’s eligibility at the date of this report.
- 22 U.S.C. §2378d and 10 U.S.C. §362, the Leahy restrictions concerning certain foreign security units and the provisions specific to each statute.
- USTR, notification of intent to remove South Africa and Rwanda from AGOA, 2 November 2026, announced effective date 1 January 2027.
- Senator John Hickenlooper, bipartisan critical minerals initiative, 1 October 2026. Evidence of shared interest, not consensus on all African agreements.