The situation is all the more alarming because the country endured a devastating war in the north between 2020 and 2022. The cessation-of-hostilities agreement signed in Pretoria in November 2022 was intended to pave the way for lasting stability.
Four years later, unfulfilled commitments, rivalries among Tigrayan leaders and interventions by neighbouring powers have eroded some of that hope. To understand the renewed tensions, we must examine the commitments made when the previous war ended.
The Pretoria Commitments
The Pretoria agreement ended a particularly deadly phase of the conflict between the federal government and Tigrayan forces.
But halting the fighting was not the same as resolving the disputes that had caused it.
Disarmament, the reintegration of fighters, the return of displaced people and the status of disputed territories all required difficult decisions. Implementation has been incomplete.
Eritrean forces and Amhara armed groups remained in certain areas. Rivalries within the Tigrayan political movement intensified. Tensions between the federal government and regional authorities eventually took on a renewed military dimension.
Unresolved territorial disputes, the continued presence of armed forces and political rivalries left the agreement vulnerable to a resumption of fighting.
The cessation of hostilities agreement was concluded in Pretoria on 2 November 2022, following talks that began on 25 October under the auspices of an African Union panel comprising Olusegun Obasanjo, Uhuru Kenyatta and Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. The agreement also sought to restore services, secure humanitarian access and promote reconciliation. These identifiable commitments provide precise criteria against which to assess its implementation.
The problem is not solely military. It concerns political representation, civilian safety, and the guarantees offered to former adversaries. The difficulties in implementing the agreement point to an older disagreement over how the state should be organised.
Federalism and the Centralisation of Power
Ethiopia has a distinctive political history, shaped by the coexistence of diverse peoples, languages and political traditions.
Ethnic federalism, enshrined in the country’s institutional structure, sought to recognise this plurality by granting the different regions autonomy based in particular on national and linguistic identities. Yet while this system enabled certain forms of political recognition, it also encouraged territorial rivalries and conflicts over the distribution of power.
Abiy Ahmed advocates a more integrated conception of the nation. To that end, he established the Prosperity Party. But his vision of unity has failed to win the consent of those who fear the recentralisation of power and the loss of regional autonomy.
When these two interpretations become irreconcilable, the army tends to replace negotiation.
Tensions with Eritrea
The threat of conflict with Eritrea makes the crisis still more dangerous. Relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara underwent a remarkable rapprochement after Abiy Ahmed came to power, culminating in his Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. But that reconciliation did not withstand the upheavals caused by the Tigray war.
Ethiopia now accuses Eritrea of supporting forces hostile to its government. Asmara, for its part, accuses Addis Ababa of seeking a pretext to secure sovereign access to the Red Sea by force.
Ethiopia’s need for maritime access is real. Since Eritrea gained independence in 1993, Ethiopia has had no sovereign coastline. But does an economic or strategic need give a state the right to challenge its neighbour’s borders by force?
Access to the sea can be arranged through port agreements, concessions, trade corridors and regional cooperation. It must not become the basis for another war.
Ethiopia has considerable strengths: a large population, a long political history, significant diplomatic influence, and industrial and energy ambitions.
Addis Ababa is home to the African Union headquarters. That symbolic position contrasts with the Ethiopian state’s difficulties in securing its own stability.
The country could play a major role in the economic and political integration of the Horn of Africa. But that ambition requires institutions capable of resolving disputes without resorting to armed force.
Ethiopia’s future will depend less on one side achieving a definitive victory than on the possibility of building a political order in which today’s adversaries can live without preparing for tomorrow’s war.