These rules are intended to prevent a small number of countries from monopolising senior positions. They do not eliminate diplomatic rivalries. Throughout the campaign, candidates held consultations with heads of state, while governments sought support beyond their customary alliances.
The stakes were considerable. The Commission chairperson heads the organisation’s permanent administration, represents it in numerous negotiations and helps prepare decisions for heads of state. Commissioners oversee its principal technical departments, including political affairs, peace and security.
Yet the February 2025 election also exposed a fundamental limitation: Commission leaders can prepare, coordinate, and advocate common policies, but they cannot compel member states to implement them at will. This gap between institutional responsibility and effective capacity has marked the African Union throughout its history.
Contested positions, constrained authority
The institutional reform launched in 2018 reduced the Commission’s leadership to eight members: a chairperson, a deputy chairperson and six commissioners. The aim was to improve coordination between departments, reduce administrative duplication and strengthen accountability.
In February 2025, Nigeria’s Bankole Adeoye was re-elected to head the department responsible for political affairs, peace and security. This portfolio is central to an organisation confronting wars in Sudan and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as security crises in the Sahel.
His re-election does not, however, give him the means to end these conflicts. The Peace and Security Council, made up of representatives of member states, remains a crucial political body. The most sensitive decisions also depend on governments’ positions, their military and financial resources and, frequently, cooperation with regional organisations.
This structure explains why securing a post should not be mistaken for acquiring independent continental authority. A commissioner may hold an important mandate yet be unable to act when states refuse the necessary compromises. The organisation’s finances offer an even clearer measure of that dependence.
A $796 million budget, but limited financial autonomy
For 2026, the African Union approved an overall budget of approximately US$796 million. This included a regular budget of around $692.4 million, alongside funds channelled through the organisation and technical assistance financing.
Within the regular budget, operational expenditure amounted to approximately $169.7 million, funded mainly by mandatory contributions from member states.
The position was different for programmes. Of an allocation of approximately $297 million, only $67.3 million was expected to come from member states, African institutions and other internal resources. The remainder depended heavily on external partners.
This distribution reveals a structural problem. African states fund most of the administrative machinery, but a substantial proportion of the programmes they approve relies on resources they do not fully control.
Late payments compound this dependence. By 30 June 2026, member states had paid approximately $132.7 million of the $200 million due in mandatory contributions to the regular budget. The collection rate therefore stood at 66 per cent halfway through the financial year.
In July, the organisation imposed financial sanctions of varying severity on several states in arrears. Chad, Uganda and Malawi were among those subject to first-level sanctions, while São Tomé and Príncipe faced intermediate sanctions. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger were placed in the most severe sanctions category.
The problem is therefore not simply the size of the budget. It concerns the regularity of payments, the actual availability of funds and the ability to finance joint operations over time. An organisation whose members fail to meet their own financial obligations can scarcely claim to possess all the means required to carry out its policies.
Sudan, the DRC and the Sahel: the test of conflict
Since April 2023, Sudan has been devastated by war between the Sudanese Armed Forces, commanded by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. The fighting has caused mass displacement, destroyed infrastructure and produced a major humanitarian crisis.
The African Union has pursued diplomatic initiatives, while the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Nations, and several external powers have undertaken their own. The proliferation of mediation frameworks has made it harder to establish a single political process acceptable to the parties.
In eastern DRC, the African Union has had to work alongside initiatives by the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, as well as the Luanda and Nairobi diplomatic processes. The advance of M23, mutual accusations between Kinshasa and Kigali, and the involvement of several regional armies have shown how difficult it is to reach a common position when neighbouring states’ interests diverge.
In the Sahel, the difficulty is also institutional. Following coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all three countries were suspended from African Union activities. At the same time, they established the Alliance of Sahel States and began withdrawing from the Economic Community of West African States, a withdrawal that took effect in January 2025.
The continental organisation consequently finds itself dealing with governments it has sanctioned politically, but whose cooperation remains necessary on security, population movements and the fight against armed groups.
These crises do not demonstrate that the African Union serves no purpose. They show, rather, that its capacity to intervene remains heavily dependent on states' willingness to support collectively taken decisions.
An important reform of peace-operation financing was designed precisely to address this weakness.
Financing peace operations: progress still to be realised
In December 2023, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2719, opening the possibility of financing African Union-led peace support operations, on a case-by-case basis, through UN assessed contributions.
Under the arrangement, these contributions may cover up to 75 per cent of the annual budget of authorised operations, with the remainder raised through other means. Funding is neither automatic nor available indiscriminately to every mission: each operation must meet specific conditions and receive Security Council authorisation.
The advance is nonetheless significant. For years, African operations have suffered from unpredictable financing negotiated separately with external partners for each mission.
The African Union has also sought to build its own Peace Fund. According to a decision adopted in July 2026, cumulative contributions from member states since 2017 had reached approximately $353.5 million.
Both mechanisms represent attempts to find practical solutions. Their effectiveness will nevertheless depend on the ability to deploy operations, monitor expenditure, protect civilians and assess the results achieved.
It is on precisely this ground that the organisation can strengthen its credibility: through mechanisms that work in practice, rather than through the announcement of new ones.