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Who Pays for the African Union?

Continental financing, Member State contributions and dependence on external partners: ten years after Kigali, the African Union’s autonomy remains an unfinished political project.

Mansi-Dongi Dokoma25 October 2026
African Union Conference Centre in Addis Ababa
The African Union Conference Centre in Addis Ababa. Photo: Elmschrat / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA.

Financing the African Union is an eminently political question. Can a continental organisation that relies heavily on external contributions to implement its programmes freely define its priorities? But can African States demand greater independence while failing to pay the contributions they themselves agreed to regularly?

In July 2016, meeting in Kigali, African Heads of State and Government adopted the principle of a 0.2% levy on certain imports from countries outside the continent. The decision aimed to provide more regular financing for the organisation, its programmes, and its peace operations. Ten years later, implementation remains uneven.

The 2026 discussions on the 2027 budget and the new scale of contributions for 2027–2029 have brought this contradiction back to the centre of debate. The issue is not simply how to divide a bill among fifty-five Member States. It is about determining what kind of institution African governments genuinely intend to build and how far they are prepared to provide it with the means to realise its ambitions.

The $800 million figure mentioned in some reports on the 2027 budget should not be presented as definitively adopted without confirmation in the corresponding budget decision. The official documents, however, establish that negotiations and reform proposals exist.

A continental ambition under budgetary constraint

The African Union operates in areas that no State can coordinate alone: conflict prevention, collective security, public health, economic integration, mobility and diplomatic representation. The expansion of these responsibilities has not been accompanied by a continental fiscal capacity comparable to that of a State.

Mandatory Member State contributions are one source of the organisation’s resources. International partners also finance part of its programmes and peace-support operations. These two sources do not carry the same conditions of use or the same political implications. A statutory contribution decided collectively reflects an institutional commitment; funding earmarked for a programme also depends on the donor’s priorities.

This difference does not justify treating all external assistance as interference. Financial cooperation can serve shared objectives and enable useful action. The problem arises when insufficient own resources restrict the freedom to define, sustain or modify programmes. An institution may formally retain decision-making power while losing some capacity for initiative.

The paradox of unpaid contributions

African Union documents have long pointed to a gap between contributions assessed and sums actually collected. Institutional documentation on financing refers, for the period it describes, to an average collection rate of around 67% of assessed contributions, together with partial or complete defaults by many members. These historical data should not be confused with a verified rate for the 2026 financial year.

Payment delays do not all have the same causes. Some States face budget crises or conflict; others prioritise spending in ways that place continental commitments lower on the agenda. Attributing all arrears indiscriminately to a lack of political will would be misleading. But it would be equally misleading to treat non-payment as a mere accounting difficulty.

Membership of an organisation entails reciprocal obligations. When a government helps adopt ambitious objectives without providing the necessary resources, it implicitly shifts the cost of its choices onto other members or external partners. Continental solidarity cannot be sustainable unless it is translated into predictable commitments.

The Kigali decision still awaits full implementation

The 2016 Kigali decision was intended to lift this constraint. The 0.2% levy applies to categories of eligible imports from non-member countries. Its proceeds were to fund operating, programme, and peace-support budgets. It is therefore neither a uniform tax on all African trade nor a tax collected directly by an autonomous continental revenue authority.

The mechanism relies on national administrations to collect and transfer the sums. Its success therefore depends on legislative and administrative decisions in each State, the applicable customs regimes, and the willingness to allocate the revenues to the organisation.

In November 2024, the Pan-African Parliament relayed a concerning finding from the Commission: according to figures then presented, only 17 Member States had implemented the levy since 2019. This count should not be treated as an accurate snapshot of the situation in October 2026, but it highlights the reform's structurally slow implementation.

States had adopted a mechanism intended to reduce their financial dependence. Yet its implementation remains contingent on each government’s domestic choices. Continental autonomy is therefore constrained less by a lack of known solutions than by the difficulty of turning a common decision into obligations that are actually fulfilled.

The budget reveals a hierarchy of power

Financing operating expenditure, programmes and peace operations does not raise exactly the same issues. An organisation may pay its staff and maintain its institutions through Member State contributions while relying on partners for a substantial share of its interventions.

The 2024 budget decision provides a clear example: of an approved overall budget of about $605.8 million, $370.1 million was expected from international partners. At that time, those partners were expected to finance the peace-support operations budget. These figures concern 2024, not the 2027 budget under discussion.

Dependence is therefore not merely quantitative. It also concerns the nature of the expenditure being financed. When operations most directly connected with the continent’s security depend on external commitments, changes in donor priorities can undermine the continuity of collective action.

Autonomy would not necessarily mean financing every operation without international cooperation. Rather, it would mean African institutions can set their priorities, negotiate the support they need, and ensure continuity of their fundamental commitments without permanent uncertainty over available resources.

Which country should pay more?

The distribution of contributions raises a fairness question among members. Arithmetical equality of payments would ignore substantial differences in economic size, income and fiscal capacity. Conversely, concentrating too much of the burden on a few countries could create the perception that they are financing policies over which they exercise no proportionate control.

Debates over the 2027–2029 scale of contributions illustrate this tension. A February 2026 decision refers to several options and further consultations, including at Angola’s request, before consideration scheduled for June. Subsequent discussions were also marked, in July, by a report that Kenya and Ethiopia had voluntarily moved to a higher contribution category.

Higher contributions from the largest economies can strengthen the organisation. But a Union financed mainly by a limited number of members must guard against an implicit political hierarchy.

“Financing should be proportionate to capacity without turning the capacity to pay into a privilege to decide.”

This problem cannot be resolved by a technical formula alone. It requires sufficiently robust rules on representation, budgetary oversight and transparency of decisions to convince members that their contribution supports a common institution rather than a structure dominated by a handful of governments.

Sovereignty is not freedom from scrutiny

The case for self-financing cannot exempt the African Union from a corresponding requirement of transparency. Resources collected from populations, including indirectly through import duties, must be justified by results and subjected to effective oversight.

The Kigali mechanism provides rules for monitoring and financial accountability. The existence of such rules is indispensable, but their significance depends on their implementation. States will be less willing to transfer revenues to an institution whose expenditure is poorly explained; citizens, meanwhile, may perceive the levy as an additional burden without an identifiable return.

Budgetary autonomy must therefore not be confused with immunity from democratic oversight. On the contrary, an organisation financed largely by Africans should be more directly accountable to them. Budget, procurement, and results transparency are political conditions for the legitimacy of the contribution.

Peace in Africa dependent on international financing

Collective security makes the contradictions particularly visible. Armed crises require rapid, substantial and sustained resources. Yet predictability remains limited when financial commitments are negotiated operation by operation.

The Commission’s annual report, published in 2026, recommends strengthening the Peace Fund, diversifying its financing sources, and continuing implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 on financing African Union-led peace operations under certain conditions.

Such cooperation can expand operational capacity without necessarily undermining African control over decisions. But it requires safeguards concerning mandates, oversight mechanisms, force accountability and burden-sharing arrangements. Who pays cannot be separated from who defines the intervention and to whom those responsible are accountable.

No independence without financing from African States

The African Union’s financial dependence cannot be attributed to a single actor. It results from unequal fiscal capacities, national political choices, payment delays, unfinished institutional integration and persistent reliance on external support.

It is tempting to contrast an Africa aspiring to autonomy with partners supposedly determined to keep it dependent. Such a representation would omit an essential part of the problem. African governments already possess collectively agreed instruments whose implementation remains incomplete. Financial independence first requires commitments made in the name of the continent to become obligations actually honoured.

It also requires recognising that Member State contributions are not merely a matter of diplomatic prestige. An institution capable of sustained action must have regular revenues, a comprehensible budget and rigorous oversight. African citizens have the right to ask what each item of continental expenditure produces and why some national commitments remain unfulfilled.

The 2027 budget debate confronts governments with their commitments. They have entrusted the African Union with missions whose implementation still depends largely on external financing.

The African Union’s autonomy requires regular contributions, priorities decided collectively and public oversight of expenditure. External financing may remain useful; it should not, on its own, determine the continuity of continental missions.