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Mérisphère Research · International relations and geopolitics

The Illusion of Peace Agreements and the Commodification of Security in the Great Lakes

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Sovereignty, territorial expansionism and the restoration of the Congolese state through the Decentralised Symbiotic Method

Political historian and researcher in the geopolitics of the Great Lakes
RESEARCH ARTICLE AND GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSISBritish English · Translation from FrenchMS-RECH-LONYAMA-2026-04

Abstract

Since the late 1990s, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has been the scene of successive military interventions, diplomatic negotiations and bilateral or multilateral agreements whose results remain disproportionate to their stated ambitions. From Lusaka (1999) to Washington (2025), via Pretoria, Luanda, Nairobi, Goma and Addis Ababa, peace has regularly been announced and negotiated, but rarely consolidated in the territories concerned; this amply demonstrates that agreements do not systematically remove the underlying causes of conflict.

This article examines the relationship between access to strategic minerals, international security commitments and Congolese territorial sovereignty. It argues that lasting peace cannot result from contractual diplomacy alone. It requires the effective restoration of state authority, reform of defence and security institutions, control of borders, credible justice and a balanced regional policy. The Decentralised Symbiotic Method (DSM) is proposed as a framework for sovereign, cooperative and multilevel governance of border areas.

Keywords: DRC; Great Lakes; sovereignty; strategic minerals; peace agreements; Rwanda; territorial integrity; state authority; Decentralised Symbiotic Method.

Author’s original English abstract

Since the late 1990s, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced successive military interventions, diplomatic negotiations and bilateral or multilateral agreements. From Lusaka (1999) to Washington (2025), peace has repeatedly been negotiated and proclaimed, yet remains fragile in the territories concerned. This article critically examines the relationship between strategic mineral access, international security commitments and Congolese territorial sovereignty. It argues that sustainable peace cannot result from diplomatic agreements alone. It requires the effective restoration of state authority, institutional reform, territorial control, justice and balanced regional cooperation. The decentralised symbiotic method (DSM) is proposed as an alternative framework for sovereign and cooperative border governance in the Great Lakes region.

Keywords: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Great Lakes, Sovereignty, strategic minerals, peace agreements, Rwanda, territorial integrity, state authority, DSM.

Introduction

When peace becomes an object of economic negotiation, the security situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo raises a question that extends beyond national borders: can lasting peace truly be built on economic and security arrangements when the structural causes of instability remain insufficiently addressed? The expression ‘access to minerals in exchange for security support’ calls for a dispassionate, yet deeply critical analysis.

Two realities must be distinguished: on the one hand, the DRC possesses strategic mineral resources whose supply chains the major powers seek to secure; on the other, it continues to face a sovereignty crisis in parts of its territory, where armed groups and foreign forces have helped replace public authority with de facto administrations. The convergence of these two realities produces a geopolitical paradox: can a state whose natural resources are indispensable to the global energy transition obtain lasting security without first possessing sufficient institutional and military capacity to exercise its sovereignty?

The DRC–United States strategic partnership, signed on 4 December 2025, merits examination in the light of this question. It establishes a framework for cooperation covering critical minerals, infrastructure and governance, while providing for economic mechanisms and a security component. This instrument should not, however, be presented as an explicit contract exchanging minerals for military intervention: that interpretation must be distinguished from the precise legal content of the commitments.

This study advances the following hypothesis: lasting peace in the Great Lakes cannot be achieved through a proliferation of economic and diplomatic agreements unless the DRC simultaneously restores its capacity for territorial control, its institutional strength and its strategic autonomy.

I. From Lusaka to Washington: the history of a peace repeatedly announced

1. The 1999 Lusaka Agreement: the promise of ending the regional war

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed on 10 July 1999, was one of the first major international attempts to resolve the Second Congo War. Its participants included the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda. It provided for a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of foreign forces, the disarmament of foreign armed groups, an inter-Congolese dialogue and the restoration of state administration throughout the national territory.

The paradox was already apparent: although the agreement recognised Congo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, fighting and foreign interventions continued. Lusaka established the legal principles of peace without immediately succeeding in enforcing them.

2. Pretoria and Luanda: the withdrawal of foreign armies in return for security assurances

On 30 July 2002, the DRC and Rwanda signed the Pretoria Agreement. The Congolese government undertook, among other things, to take measures against armed groups hostile to Rwanda, while Kigali was to withdraw its forces from Congolese territory. On 6 September 2002, a similar agreement was concluded in Luanda with Uganda, covering the withdrawal of Ugandan troops and the normalisation of bilateral relations. These agreements reflected a logic of security reciprocity: the DRC was to address its neighbours’ security concerns, while they were to respect its territorial sovereignty. Their weakness lay, in particular, in the gap between diplomatic commitments and national capacities for monitoring, prevention and enforcement.

3. Sun City: political pacification without sufficient transformation of the state

The inter-Congolese dialogue at Sun City produced a political transition framework, enshrined in the Global and Inclusive Agreement of December 2002 and the concluding texts of 2003. This sequence contributed to the institutional reunification of the country, the formation of a transitional government and the holding of elections in 2006. However, the integration of former belligerents into institutions and the armed forces sometimes prioritised an immediate political balance over a thorough reform of the security apparatus. Integrating armed actors into the state does not automatically ensure their transformation into actors fully subject to republican discipline; rather, it constitutes a time bomb for institutional weakness and the slow, progressive erosion of the national security apparatus.

4. Nairobi, Goma and 23 March 2009: the recurring cycle of integration and disintegration

The Nairobi Communiqué of 9 November 2007 sought to organise cooperation between Kinshasa and Kigali against foreign armed groups. In January 2008, the Goma agreements, concluded with several armed groups, provided notably for a ceasefire, the separation of forces and mechanisms for disarmament or integration. On 23 March 2009, an agreement was signed between the Congolese government and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), which would later prove to be a large tree concealing a dense forest. Experience revealed a major weakness: integration mechanisms did not always dismantle chains of command, networks of influence and capacities for armed mobilisation. The emergence of the M23 in 2012, followed by its resurgence from 2021, illustrates the limits of this approach when it is not accompanied by thorough state reform and rigorous oversight of military integration.

5. Addis Ababa in 2013: a regional framework that did not remove the causes of conflict

The Addis Ababa Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region of 24 February 2013 committed the DRC to pursuing institutional reforms and the states of the region to respecting sovereignty, refraining from supporting armed groups and strengthening regional cooperation. It was an attempt to move beyond ad hoc negotiations towards a regional security framework. Yet the persistence of armed groups and the subsequent resumption of violence show that signing a regional framework is insufficient to neutralise the economic, military and political interests that sustain conflicts. The problem is therefore not simply a lack of diplomatic texts, but also their implementation, verification and political enforceability.

6. Washington and Doha: a new generation of agreements and the mineral question

The fall of Goma in January 2025, followed by that of Bukavu, profoundly changed the balance of power in eastern Congo. The final report of the United Nations Group of Experts of 3 July 2025 documents the involvement of the Rwanda Defence Force in the M23’s territorial expansion, as well as its presence in occupied territories. It also stresses that control of these territories increased Rwanda’s access to mineral-rich areas and fertile land. On 27 June 2025, Kinshasa and Kigali signed the Washington Peace Agreement under American mediation. Its provisions include respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the disengagement of forces, the neutralisation of the FDLR, security coordination, support for the Doha process between the Congolese government and the AFC/M23, and regional economic integration. On 4 December 2025, the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity were formalised within a framework of regional economic integration. The DRC–United States strategic partnership of the same date, for its part, establishes economic and mining mechanisms, notably a strategic asset reserve and rights of first offer granted to American operators for certain projects. Precision is essential: the text does not legally present access to minerals as direct payment for American military intervention. It is a strategic partnership combining several fields, including mining and security cooperation. It is precisely this relationship that merits critical examination.

United Nations reports published in 2026 describe continuing fighting and difficulties in implementing commitments. The existence of an international agreement is therefore not, in itself, proof of its effectiveness on the ground.

The futility of agreements: why does diplomatic peace fail to become territorial peace?

The contradiction between signed peace and lived peace

The term ‘futility’ does not mean that all these agreements lack legal or political value. Several have produced important institutional results. It refers here to their recurring inability to resolve the structural problems that cause conflicts in eastern Congo. An agreement may be signed in a foreign capital, before international television cameras, accompanied by solemn declarations. But populations do not measure peace by the quality of diplomatic ceremonies. They measure it by freedom of movement, the security of people and property, an end to large-scale massacres constituting an unacknowledged genocide of the century, the reopening of schools and markets, the voluntary return of displaced people, the end of parallel armed administrations and the effective presence of justice and public services. Peace that does not take material form in everyday life remains essentially declaratory.

The contradiction between economic interests and the security of populations

The presence of strategic minerals in eastern Congo is a source of covetousness and international competition. However, reducing all conflicts to minerals alone would be reductive. Local antagonisms, land disputes, contested citizenship, refugee movements, foreign armed groups, military interests and institutional failings also play a part.

The danger arises when the economic exploitation of resources takes precedence over protecting populations and restoring public authority. The DRC then risks a paradoxical situation: its underground resources are integrated into global supply chains while the populations living in the territories concerned continue to suffer insecurity. The fundamental question concerns the distribution of benefits, responsibilities and guarantees: who provides security, who extracts, who controls, who processes and who actually benefits from Congolese resources?

The contradiction between legal sovereignty and effective sovereignty

Congolese sovereignty is recognised under international law. However, the legal recognition of a territory does not automatically guarantee its effective administration: this is the major void in the 1964 principle of the inviolability of borders. A distinction must be drawn between legal sovereignty, which refers to the state’s right to exercise authority over its territory; political sovereignty, which concerns its capacity to decide its direction freely; economic sovereignty, which involves control over its resources; and security sovereignty, which corresponds to its capacity to protect its populations and borders. The eastern crisis reveals the gap between these dimensions.

The DRC possesses legally incontestable sovereignty, but its effective sovereignty remains weakened wherever armed actors impose their administration, levies and rules.

The Rwandan question: between legitimate security concerns and a dynamic of territorial expansion

1. Security discourse as a justification for regional intervention. Since the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has presented the presence of the FDLR on Congolese territory as a threat to its national security. This concern cannot be dismissed without examination. The presence of armed groups hostile to a neighbouring state does indeed constitute a regional security problem. However, a security concern, even a legitimate one, cannot provide a legal basis for unilateral military intervention, territorial occupation or a challenge to a sovereign state’s territorial integrity. The principle of non-intervention remains essential. Neutralising a cross-border threat cannot become a permanent right to intervene in a neighbour’s territory.

2. Territorial expansion: analysing facts rather than relying solely on declarations. The expression ‘Rwandan expansionism’ must be used with scientific rigour. Merely asserting that Kigali pursues a formal project of territorial annexation does not establish that intention judicially or historically. It is, however, possible to analyse an expansionist dynamic through documented facts: the presence of Rwandan forces on Congolese territory; military support for the M23 documented by United Nations experts; the conquest and occupation of strategic territories; the establishment of parallel administrations in conquered areas; increased access to mineral-rich areas and agricultural land; and the weakening of Congolese administrative and security authority. These facts support a serious geopolitical hypothesis: persistent instability in eastern Congo may generate strategic, territorial and economic advantages for actors exercising military influence over these areas. This hypothesis must be tested against political practices, military movements, commercial networks and territorial data.

3. From securing borders to upsetting the regional balance: the issue does not concern Rwanda and the DRC alone. The Great Lakes region comprises states whose security, economic and geopolitical interests are closely intertwined: Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya and the DRC, among others. A lasting crisis in eastern Congo may lead to the progressive militarisation of borders, the proliferation of competing military alliances, competition for natural resources, the instrumentalisation of cross-border communities, forced population displacement, polarisation between rival powers liable to lead to confrontation between international military powers, and disruption of regional trade.

Rwanda’s security cannot be guaranteed in the long term through its neighbour’s permanent insecurity. Conversely, the DRC’s security cannot be built by ignoring its neighbours’ legitimate security concerns. The solution must be regional, without compromising Congolese sovereignty.

The mining–security partnership trap: can the DRC buy its own security?

The geopolitical value of Congolese minerals: cobalt, copper, lithium, germanium, coltan and other strategic resources interest the major powers because of their industrial, energy, technological and military importance. The DRC therefore occupies a strategic position in global supply chains. Its partnership with Washington forms part of this international competition. The United States also pursues national interests: diversifying supply chains, securing critical minerals, industrial competitiveness and reducing certain strategic dependencies. This does not automatically make the partnership unfavourable to the DRC. An agreement can be mutually beneficial. But it imposes a requirement: economic benefits and security commitments must be measurable, reciprocal and legally framed. 2. The risk of security conditional on mining interests. A question must be asked directly: if Congolese minerals represent a major strategic interest

for Washington, why should the security of the Congolese population be treated as a commercial quid pro quo rather than a fundamental obligation under international law and the principles of sovereignty? A state’s security is not a commodity. It should not depend on the quantity of minerals it can offer a foreign power. A distinction must be drawn between security cooperation (assistance, training, intelligence, capacity-building and defence technology transfer), a security guarantee (a precise, legally defined commitment accompanied by verification mechanisms) and military intervention (direct operational action on the ground). An economic partnership accompanied by a security memorandum does not automatically mean that a partner state undertakes to defend the DRC militarily against any aggression. The DRC must avoid confusing the major powers’ strategic interest in its resources with their willingness to guarantee its territorial integrity in the long term.

The weakness of Congolese guarantees: a national responsibility to assume. The observation that the DRC does not offer strong guarantees should not be interpreted solely as external criticism. It raises an internal question: what institutional guarantees can the DRC offer investors, international partners and its own population? The answers involve legal and contractual stability, transparency in allocating mining concessions, combating corruption, securing extraction sites, mineral traceability, reliable judicial institutions, effective border control through the new governance approach of the Decentralised Symbiotic Method, and continuity in public policy. A state with insufficient control over the areas where its resources are extracted inevitably struggles to ensure their lawful exploitation and protect the populations concerned. Minerals must not become the price of restoring state authority; they must become an instrument for financing and consolidating that authority and for the sustainable development of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Restoring state authority: a requirement that goes beyond military reconquest alone

Restoring military sovereignty

The first requirement is to rebuild a professional, disciplined, republican and adequately equipped national army. This reconstruction must rest on structural reform of the FARDC, professional recruitment, tactical and strategic training, control of the chain of command, rigorous management of equipment and ammunition, military and territorial intelligence, rapid-response capacity, protection of civilian populations and parliamentary and institutional oversight of defence. Integrating armed groups must no longer be an automatic solution to every crisis. A national army cannot remain effective if its chains of command become negotiating arenas for former belligerents. Hence the establishment of four major military academies and 26 refresher training centres is imperative.

2. Restoring territorial administration

Military reconquest without civilian administration would be an incomplete victory. In the territories concerned, the state must restore provincial and territorial administrations, civil registration services, land administration and cadastral services, courts and public prosecutors’ offices, customs services, migration services, revenue agencies, schools and healthcare institutions, and legally recognised local authorities. All forms of parallel administration imposed by armed groups must end. The return of the state must be reflected in administrative acts, public services and citizens’ everyday protection.

3. Restoring judicial authority

Impunity is one of the mechanisms through which conflicts reproduce themselves. Those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, sexual violence, massacres, looting and the unlawful exploitation of resources must answer for their actions before the competent courts. Justice cannot be selective. It must also tackle the economic networks financing armed groups, cross-border trafficking and institutional complicity. Without justice, peace risks becoming a mere arrangement between armed actors.

4. Restoring economic and mining sovereignty

The DRC must move from supplying raw materials to acting as a sovereign participant in its value chains. This requires local mineral processing, control over mining contracts, effective taxation of activities, combating smuggling, digital traceability, participation by local communities, the construction of transport and energy infrastructure, and equitable redistribution of mining revenues. A strategic partnership has meaning only if it strengthens the country’s productive and institutional capacities.

Restoring border sovereignty

The border must no longer be considered merely a line on a map watched over by a handful of military posts. It is a geographical, human, economic and strategic space. The DRC must strengthen its capacity to monitor its borders with Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania, without neglecting lake areas and cross-border routes. This entails up-to-date mapping of border areas, modern checkpoints, secure communications, radar and appropriate surveillance tools, drones used within a legal framework, customs and migration cooperation, controlled intelligence-sharing and permanent border commissions. Restoring state authority therefore requires an integration of military, administrative, judicial, economic and technological resources.

The Decentralised Symbiotic Method (DSM): moving beyond permanent militarisation

1. Theoretical foundation: symbiosis as a principle of complementarity. The DSM proposes moving beyond an exclusively military and centralised conception of managing Congo’s eastern borders. It rests on the idea that borders are simultaneously spaces of sovereignty, circulation, interdependence and cooperation. It is in no way a matter of erasing international borders, sharing territorial sovereignty or placing the Congolese state under foreign administration. It is about exercising national sovereignty more effectively through decentralised institutional organisation and controlled functional cooperation. In biology, symbiosis refers to enduring relationships between organisms of different species. Transposed cautiously to international relations and border governance, it enables reflection on complementary relationships between institutions, communities and neighbouring states. The political symbiosis proposed here is not spontaneous harmony. It is an institutional construction founded on rules, responsibilities, oversight mechanisms and reciprocal interests.

2. The five operational principles of the DSM

First principle: institutional complementarity. National, provincial, territorial, military, customs and migration institutions must work in a coordinated manner. No institution can, on its own, ensure security throughout border areas.

Second principle: territorial subsidiarity. Local authorities, border communities and legally recognised customary authorities must participate in conflict prevention and citizen monitoring. This participation must remain governed by law and under the authority of the competent institutions.

Third principle: functional interdependence. Neighbouring states must cooperate on problems that extend beyond their borders: trafficking, the movement of armed groups, refugees, cross-border trade, organised crime and the protection of shared resources. Cooperation does not mean merging sovereignties. Nor would this approach prevent the DRC from applying the DSM internally and unilaterally.

Fourth principle: technological innovation. Digital tools, geolocation systems, radar, drones and interconnected databases can improve knowledge of the territory and the speed of interventions. Technology must nevertheless remain subject to the law, data protection and human oversight.

Fifth principle: controlled regional cooperation. Relations with Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania must be structured around bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms. Information exchanges must be verifiable, reciprocal and compatible with protecting Congolese strategic interests, on an ongoing basis.

The DSM’s operational chain

The DSM can be organised around an institutional cycle in five stages: 1) Information collection: data supplied by security services, local administrations and border communities. 2) Analysis and verification: cross-checking information, geolocation and threat identification. 3) Institutional decision: a decision taken by the legally competent Congolese authority. 4) Coordinated intervention: action by military, police, customs, migration or judicial services, according to the nature of the threat. 5) Evaluation and oversight: measuring results, checking responsibilities and correcting dysfunctions. 4. Application to Congo’s four eastern borders. DRC–Rwanda: monitoring military, commercial and population movements, controlling mineral flows and preventing armed infiltration. DRC–Uganda: controlling commercial networks, armed and population movements, and cross-border trafficking. DRC–Burundi: securing crossings, migration cooperation and preventing tensions around the Ruzizi. DRC–Tanzania: lake surveillance, control of exchanges and securing commercial networks on Lake Tanganyika. The DSM must also cover the border areas of Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika, the Semliki areas and the main trade corridors. Staff and personnel of these border governance institutions must not remain at any assigned post for more than three days; they will be subject to rotational mobility to limit the familiarity that opens the way to corruption risks.

The DSM as an alternative to externally imposed peace

The principal innovation of this approach is to shift the centre of gravity of security policy. Rather than systematically awaiting another international mediation after each military escalation, the DRC would equip itself with permanent mechanisms for prevention, anticipation and cooperation. The DSM replaces neither the national army nor international agreements. It establishes the institutional conditions necessary to implement those agreements. It would be a practice, a mindset of change, a civilisation to sustain, thus proposing a transition from essentially reactive security to preventive, territorially grounded and cooperative security. Under these conditions, borders would peacefully become spaces for living and exchange serving the sustainable development of the Great Lakes.

Its effectiveness will need to be evaluated empirically through precise indicators: fewer border incidents, reduced trafficking, improved information-sharing, restored public services, increased lawful trade and reduced forced displacement. Sovereignty is not shared; operational responsibilities can, however, be coordinated while respecting that sovereignty.

Conditions for success: what the DRC must absolutely avoid

Avoiding a diplomacy of dependence

The DRC must not replace one strategic dependence with another. Cooperation with the United States, China, the European Union or other partners must rest on a rigorous assessment of national interests. No partnership must compromise the Congolese state’s ability to decide freely how its resources are exploited.

Avoiding the normalisation of territorial concessions

No economic negotiation must undermine the country’s territorial integrity. Border disputes must be addressed in accordance with international law, applicable legal instruments and delimitation and demarcation mechanisms. The DRC must prevent temporary security arrangements from becoming permanent mechanisms of external control over its territories.

Avoiding the political legitimisation of military conquests

The political integration of armed actors must not automatically reward territorial conquest. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes must be individualised, verifiable and subject to the requirements of justice and national security. 4. Avoiding the exclusion of local populations. The populations of the East must no longer be regarded as merely passive beneficiaries of agreements negotiated abroad. They must participate in developing security, development and border governance policies. Peace must be built with populations, rather than simply negotiated on their behalf.

Geopolitical prospects: towards a new Congolese security doctrine in the Great Lakes

The DRC must move from a diplomacy mainly geared towards finding solutions to crises to a diplomacy of power founded on control of its resources, its territory through the DSM and its regional relations.

First direction: a national doctrine of territorial sovereignty.

The DRC must clearly define the limits of its diplomatic concessions, the conditions of its military partnerships and the mechanisms for defending its territorial integrity.

Second direction: a regional diplomacy of reciprocity. Relations with neighbouring states must be based on mutual respect for borders, non-interference, security cooperation and an equitable sharing of economic benefits. Cooperation with Rwanda must not be ruled out, but it must be conditional on verifiable and reciprocal commitments.

Third direction: a sovereign economic diplomacy. The DRC must use its natural resources as instruments of development and negotiation, rather than as a means of financing its own external security. Infrastructure development, mining industrialisation, local processing and control of trade corridors must be national priorities.

General conclusion

Peace cannot be negotiated sustainably without effective sovereignty. The history of agreements concerning the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo reveals a fundamental contradiction: the proliferation of diplomatic initiatives has not produced stability proportionate to the commitments made.

From Lusaka to Washington, successive texts have promised the withdrawal of foreign forces, the neutralisation of armed groups, regional cooperation, political reconciliation and economic development. Yet populations continue to suffer the consequences of war, while Congolese sovereignty remains contested in parts of the national territory.

The DRC–United States strategic partnership opens a new geopolitical chapter. It may offer an opportunity for infrastructure development, local mineral processing and stronger institutional capacities. But it also entails risks of dependence if economic interests are not accompanied by sufficiently precise security and institutional guarantees. It would therefore be dangerous to confuse converging mining interests with an automatic guarantee of territorial protection. The DRC must understand that its geographical position, resources and geopolitical importance do not, in themselves, constitute instruments of power. They become so only when supported by a solid institutional apparatus, a professional army, a functioning administration, credible justice and coherent diplomacy. The Rwandan question, meanwhile, must be approached lucidly. Kigali’s security concerns cannot justify either a permanent foreign military presence or the consolidation of parallel administrations on Congolese territory. Facts documented by the United Nations require a firm political and legal response, without instrumentalising community identities. Finally, restoring state authority must not be understood as a simple operation of military reconquest. It must correspond to a genuine reconstruction of Congolese sovereignty in all its dimensions. It is in this perspective that the Decentralised Symbiotic Method acquires its full significance. It proposes replacing permanent confrontation with border governance founded on institutional complementarity, territorial subsidiarity, functional interdependence, technological innovation and controlled regional cooperation. It does not ask the DRC to relinquish its sovereignty to obtain peace. On the contrary, it proposes exercising that sovereignty more effectively by intelligently organising the interdependencies that characterise the eastern borders. The real alternative is therefore not between the DRC’s isolation and its dependence on foreign powers. It lies in constructing a strategic autonomy capable of making international cooperation mutually beneficial. Peace in the Great Lakes must cease to be a succession of diplomatic promises whose price Congolese populations pay. It must become the outcome of a regional order founded on sovereignty, responsibility, justice and reciprocity. The DRC must not negotiate access to its wealth to obtain the right to live in peace on its own territory. It must strengthen the institutional, military, economic and diplomatic capacities that make its sovereignty effective and its peace lasting.

Bibliographical and documentary references

1. Organisation des Nations unies, Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 10 juillet 1999.

2. Gouvernement de la RDC et Gouvernement du Rwanda, Accord de Pretoria sur le retrait des troupes rwandaises, 30 juillet 2002.

3. Gouvernement de la RDC et Gouvernement de l’Ouganda, Accord de Luanda, 6 septembre 2002.

4. Accord global et inclusif sur la transition en RDC, Pretoria, 17 décembre 2002.

5. Gouvernement de la RDC et CNDP, Accord du 23 mars 2009, Goma.

6. Nations unies, Accord-cadre pour la paix, la sécurité et la coopération pour la RDC et la région, Addis-Abeba, 24 février 2013.

7. Gouvernement de la RDC et Gouvernement du Rwanda, Accord de paix, Washington, 27 juin 2025.

8. Gouvernement de la RDC et Gouvernement du Rwanda, Regional Economic Integration Framework, 4 décembre 2025.

9. Gouvernement des États-Unis et Gouvernement de la RDC, Strategic Partnership Agreement, 4 décembre 2025.

10. Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2025/446, 3 juillet 2025. 11. Secrétaire général des Nations unies, Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, S/2026/256, 31 mars 2026.

12. International Crisis Group, rapports et analyses consacrés aux conflits dans les Kivu et aux relations entre la RDC et le Rwanda.

13. Koko, Sadiki, « Peace at last? Appraisal of the Addis Ababa Peace and Security Cooperation Framework and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098 », African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 2013.

14. International Energy Agency, DRC-US Strategic Partnership Agreement, fiche documentaire, 31 mai 2026.

15. Baskaran, Gracelin, Building Critical Minerals Cooperation Between the United States and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, CSIS, 25 mars 2025.

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