DRC — THE RECURRENT RELIANCE OF THE ARMY ON FOREIGN CONTRACTORS
A contribution of the Decentralised Symbiotic Method to the history of an elusive army
Publication date :
Abstract
This article examines the Democratic Republic of the Congo's (DRC) recurrent reliance on foreign military personnel and private security contractors to defend its eastern territories. Using a historical and geopolitical perspective, it traces the trajectory from the Force publique through the Armée nationale congolaise and the Forces armées zaïroises to the present FARDC, highlighting both periods of operational effectiveness and recurring institutional fragilities. The analysis discusses the contemporary involvement of contractors linked to Erik Prince, the legal and political implications of outsourcing military capabilities, the risks associated with prolonged external dependence, and the need to strengthen national command, logistics, training, reserve forces and territorial surveillance. The article also presents the decentralised symbiotic method as a proposed framework for border governance combining state sovereignty, local institutional participation and regulated cross-border cooperation. It concludes that durable territorial defence requires institutional reconstruction and national capacity-building rather than permanently replacing republican armed forces with foreign expertise.
Introduction: the recurring return of a fundamental question
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s reliance on foreign military contractors to support operations in the country's east raises a fundamental question of sovereignty: how can a State with vast territory, considerable natural resources, and a large population remain so dependent on external military expertise to ensure its own defence? In an investigation published on 10 February 2026, Reuters reported that men linked to Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater, were deployed to support Congolese forces, notably using drones in the Uvira area. On 9 October 2026, the agency also reported casualties suffered by these contractors in an ambush that had occurred in September. These reports alone are insufficient to establish that national defence has been legally relinquished, but they reveal a worrying operational dependence. The issue therefore goes beyond the presence of foreign service providers: it concerns the Congolese State's capacity to generate, organise, and sustain its own military power. [1, 2]
1. From the Force publique to the FARDC: a military history marked by successes and ruptures
The military history of the Congo begins neither with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) nor with contemporary security difficulties. It goes back to the Force publique, created in 1885 and reorganised under Belgian colonial administration. This institution, which performed both military and policing functions, participated in both world wars. Its history must nevertheless be approached rigorously: it was both an instrument of colonial domination and an organisation in which Congolese soldiers acquired considerable military experience. The legacy of the Force publique is therefore an essential starting point for understanding both the possibilities and the historical contradictions of Congolese military power. [3]
2. The First World War: Tabora and the projection of Congolese military power in East Africa
During the First World War, soldiers of the Force publique fought German colonial forces in Central and East Africa. The capture of Tabora in September 1916 remains one of the most significant episodes in this history. Operations under General Charles Tombeur, in cooperation with Allied forces, demonstrated this colonial army's capacity to operate beyond the borders of Congolese territory. The campaigns covered areas corresponding today to Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. This experience is particularly relevant to the history of the Congo’s eastern borders: it reminds us that territorial security has always been linked to regional balances of power. It would nevertheless be historically inaccurate to regard these campaigns as a simple defence of the DRC’s present borders, since their objectives were those of a war between colonial powers. [4]
3. The Second World War: the Abyssinian campaign and the victory at Saïo
The Congo’s participation in the Second World War confirms the importance of this military legacy. In 1941, the Force publique fought in the East African campaign against Italian forces in Ethiopia, then called Abyssinia. The battle of Saïo, which ended on 3 July 1941 with Italy’s acceptance of a cessation of hostilities, remains a major episode of this campaign. The victory enhanced the Force publique's military prestige among the Allied forces. However, it must be interpreted in context: the successes rested on troop preparation, supervision, endurance, and the ability to operate under difficult conditions. The strategic lesson is clear: an army’s performance depends not only on the quantity of weapons available, but also on training, discipline, command and organisational coherence. [5]
4. Independence in 1960: the legacy of an army insufficiently prepared for national sovereignty
The Congo’s accession to independence on 30 June 1960 quickly exposed the political and institutional limitations of its colonial military legacy. The Force publique had not been prepared to become, under stable conditions, a national army led by Congolese officers. Tensions over command, mutinies, secessions, and political rivalries precipitated the military apparatus's disorganisation. United Nations intervention through the United Nations Operation in the Congo responded to a major crisis of the newly independent State, but also embedded the Congolese question in a complex international context. However, it is important to distinguish between temporary external support, the presence of a peacekeeping operation, and structural dependence: these three phenomena are not equivalent. The 1960 crisis shows that an army inherited from a colonial system does not automatically become a republican institution merely because of independence. [6, 7]
5. From the ANC to the FAZ: external interventions and the limits of military power
The history of the Armée nationale congolaise (ANC), followed by the Forces armées zaïroises (FAZ), reveals a persistent contradiction between asserting national military power and relying on external support. During the 1960s, the ANC fought the Simba rebellions and forces associated with Pierre Mulele with foreign military personnel, including mercenaries, and international support. Later, the Shaba crises of 1977 and 1978 exposed the FAZ's difficulty in defending the regime and its territory alone against external offensives. These episodes do not mean that the Congolese army was constantly devoid of operational capability. Instead, they show that its performance depended heavily on the quality of command, logistics, unit cohesion, and available alliances. [8]
6. From regional wars to the FARDC: the persistence of security dependence
The wars of 1996-1997 and 1998 intensified the internationalisation of the Congolese crisis. The national territory became the theatre of confrontations involving foreign armies, rebel movements, and coalitions whose interests did not necessarily align with the Congolese State's. Successive military reorganisations later led to the creation of the FARDC, without resolving all the difficulties inherited from previous conflicts. The prolonged United Nations presence, first through MONUC and then MONUSCO, forms part of this history of institutional fragility and regional threats. However, it should not be interpreted as proof that the DRC has legally lost its military sovereignty. The issue is rather one of a sovereignty whose effective exercise remains limited when national institutions lack sufficient means to control their territory and provide lasting protection to the population. [6, 7]
7. Erik Prince and private military companies: an operational response that raises questions of sovereignty
The presence in eastern DRC of contractors linked to Erik Prince must be analysed by distinguishing technical assistance, the provision of security services and direct participation in military operations. Reuters reported in February 2026 that a private team had been deployed to provide drone support to Congolese forces in operations around Uvira. In October, the agency reported human casualties among this personnel following an ambush, information that some commentators regarded as part of a campaign by pro-M23 actors to discredit Erik Prince’s organisation. These reports highlight the risks private actors face when operating in a war zone. They also raise questions of legal responsibility, operational control, contractual transparency and the protection of sensitive information. Recourse to foreign expertise may answer an urgent need, particularly in aerial surveillance, technical intelligence or maintenance. However, it becomes problematic when it permanently substitutes for developing national capabilities. External assistance should strengthen the State’s military autonomy rather than create permanent dependence on service providers whose interests, obligations and accountability mechanisms differ from those of a republican army. Therefore, pursue effective transfer of military technology and tactical know-how to make local armed forces more autonomous. Why not establish autonomous defence industries in the country’s major cities, reinforced by four major military and geostrategic academies and accompanied by twenty-six substantial centres for training, tactical and strategic refresher courses and geolocation? [1, 2, 9]
8. The threat in the East: a crisis of sovereignty, human security and national cohesion
The security crisis in eastern Congo cannot be reduced to a simple confrontation between the national army and a rebel movement. It forms part of a regional environment marked by arms circulation, cross-border economic interests, conflicts of legitimacy, forced displacement and the alleged or documented involvement of various external actors. The M23 and the AFC/M23 coalition occupy a central place in this crisis. The gravity of the situation no longer requires elaborate demonstration, since various United Nations expert reports document infringements of territorial control, population displacement, considerable loss of life and economic disruption, all of which are sufficient indicators of a major national-security crisis. [10]
9. The risk of Balkanisation: defending territorial integrity without confusing interdependence with renunciation
The lasting loss of control over parts of the territory, the installation of parallel armed authorities and the fragmentation of economic circuits can progressively weaken State authority. However, it is important to distinguish Balkanisation, understood as a process of territorial and political fragmentation, from destabilisation, which can occur without any formal alteration of international borders. In the Congolese case, the priority is to prevent both risks by restoring the State's legitimate authority, protecting populations, and strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms. The intangibility of African borders does not mean that they should become closed spaces impermeable to human exchange. Resolution AHG/Res.16(I), adopted in Cairo in July 1964 by the Organisation of African Unity, reaffirmed States' commitment to respect the borders existing at the time of their accession to independence. This rule must be reconciled with the need to promote peace, the lawful movement of people and the development of border populations. The principle of intangibility would guarantee the legal inviolability of borders while leaving aside the extreme survival needs of cross-border peoples arising from their historical proximity and regional complementarity. The Symbiotic Method seeks to address this dimension only after testing and demonstrating its empirical basis in the field, because borders must remain spaces of life and exchange under the safeguards associated with the principles of the DSM. [11, 12]
10. Training, equipping and republicanising the army: a national strategic priority
Reconstructing the FARDC must go beyond ad hoc responses to military emergencies. It requires initial and ongoing training suited to ground realities, regular payment of soldiers, reliable logistics, effective equipment maintenance, and a clearly defined chain of command. It also requires a rigorous system of recruitment, background checks, counter-intelligence, and control of access to sensitive information to reduce infiltration risks. Material modernisation must be accompanied by institutional reform that guarantees discipline, accountability, and respect for the law. The objective is not to build an army feared solely for its firepower, but a force capable of deterring aggression, protecting civilians and defending borders without becoming an instrument of personal or partisan interests or a subordinate arm of foreign outsourcing. A republican army is measured as much by its effectiveness as by its loyalty to the Constitution and civilian institutions. Ultimately, it must be an army protected from external infiltration. [8, 13]
11. Reserve forces and territorial defence: mobilising national capabilities under State control
Strengthening reserve forces can help improve national defence resilience, provided that it rests on a clear legal basis and professional organisation. Such forces must be trained, identified, supervised and subject to an institutional chain of command. They must not become partisan militias, uncontrolled self-defence groups or parallel structures liable to aggravate local conflicts. A well-organised reserve can support civil protection, early warning, terrain knowledge, and mobilisation in times of crisis. It should, however, complement the FARDC, the Congolese National Police and legally competent services without blurring their respective responsibilities. Mobilising border communities is useful when it is based on trust, rights protection, information verification, and effective reporting mechanisms. [14]
12. The Decentralised Symbiotic Method: an innovation to be tested for securing the eastern borders
Building on this analysis, the Decentralised Symbiotic Method (DSM) proposes approaching the Congo’s eastern borders as spaces of life, exchange, and interdependence rather than mere dividing lines. It rests on three dimensions: national sovereignty, participation by local institutions and communities, and regulated cross-border cooperation with neighbouring States. Its symbiotic dimension refers to the search for complementarities between actors; its decentralised dimension requires mobilising information and early-warning capacity as close as possible to realities on the ground while the State maintains coordination. In practice, the method could be tested in a defined border sector through a mechanism that brings together territorial authorities, security services, border administrations, community actors, and bilateral cooperation structures. Digital tools, geographic information systems, and technically appropriate surveillance resources could support early warning, incident detection, and controlled information-sharing.
This proposal should not, however, be regarded as a proven method: it is a governance model that still needs to be formalised, tested, and evaluated using precise indicators, including the speed at which alerts are transmitted, reductions in incidents, public confidence, and respect for fundamental rights. Its application could help prevent instability and smuggling at the border while safeguarding the integrity of the national territory. [15]
Conclusion: making military history a lever for national reconstruction
From the Force publique to the FARDC, the military history of the Congo reveals a constant pattern: the country’s defence capacity has alternated between periods of operational success and profound institutional crises. The victories of Tabora and Saïo bear witness to the experience Congolese soldiers gained during the world wars. The independence crisis, rebellions, foreign interventions and regional conflicts show, by contrast, that no military power can endure without strong institutions, coherent command, discipline, logistics and political legitimacy.
Recourse to private military companies can provide technical capability in the short term, but it does not constitute a sufficient national-defence strategy. The priority must be to rebuild a professional, republican, properly equipped army protected against infiltration, supported by an organised reserve and a territorial-surveillance system adapted to local realities. From this perspective, the Decentralised Symbiotic Method deserves rigorous experimentation as a proposal for border governance linking sovereignty, local participation and regional cooperation.
The DRC does not merely need means to fight; it needs institutions that can prevent conflict, protect its citizens, and guarantee its territorial integrity over the long term.
Bibliographic references and verification documents
1. DONATI, J. and BONNEROT, C., “Trump ally Prince sent men, drones to help Congo's army secure strategic town”, Reuters, 10 February 2026.
2. DONATI, J., “Erik Prince's forces suffer battlefield loss in Congo, former UFC fighter among wounded, sources say”, Reuters, 9 October 2026.
3. AFRICAMUSEUM, “Force Publique”, AfricaMuseum Archives, historical notice on the institution.
4. NGONGO, E., “Un autre front. Les officiers, soldats et porteurs des troupes coloniales belges lors de la bataille de Tabora”, Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 272, October-December 2018, pp. 21-34.
5. DESAINTGHISLAIN, C., L'impact de la campagne d’Abyssinie dans l’histoire de la Force publique congolaise (janvier-juillet 1941), Master’s dissertation in History, Université catholique de Louvain, 2019.
6. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, G., The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People's History, London, Zed Books, 2002.
7. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, Resolution 1925 (2010), establishing MONUSCO.
8. ROBINSON, C., “A forgotten decade? Politicking and war for the ANC/FAZ 1967-1977”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 32, no. 7, 2021, pp. 1117-1137. DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2021.1895589.
9. LONYAMA PERO, B., “De la FP aux FARDC : la nécessité des réformes significatives”, unpublished.
10. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, reports prepared pursuant to Security Council resolutions on the situation in the DRC.
11. LONYAMA PERO, B., Frontières orientales congolaises (1910-1964) : entre délimitations coloniales et contestations postcoloniales, postgraduate dissertation in Political History, FLSH-DSHCD/UNIKIN, 2026.
12. ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, Border Disputes among African States, Resolution AHG/Res.16(I), Cairo, 17-21 July 1964.
13. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, Constitution of 18 February 2006, as amended.
14. UNITED NATIONS, The United Nations Security Sector Reform Policy, New York, United Nations, 2013.
15. LONYAMA PERO, B., “Interdépendance transfrontalière et gouvernance des frontières orientales de la RDC ; la Méthode Symbiotique Décentralisée à l’épreuve de l’analyse”, Mérisphère Publishing, “History/Political Science”, accessed 21 October 2026.
Recensions de cet article
Abel Kisina
Étudiant en Master 2 Relations internationales — Moscou
Souveraineté, défense et externalisation en RDCCette recension examine la profondeur historique des fragilités militaires congolaises, les limites de l’externalisation de la défense et les conditions d’une coopération souveraine.
Lire la recensionDiscussion of the article
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