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Research article · Law / Political Science
Law / Political Science

DRC: Has Tshisekedi Been Declared Out of the Game?

Governance, Institutional Accountability and a Crisis of Confidence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Mukundi Kabala

Publication date :

Doctoral Researcher in Political Science — Paris-Panthéon-Assas University
2026-10-27

Abstract

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is experiencing persistent insecurity in the East, social grievances, controversies over public governance, and growing political polarisation over the country’s constitutional future. Searches carried out in Belgium in October 2026 as part of a judicial investigation involving relatives of President Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi gave international dimension to concerns about public affairs. Other developments include public criticism by Jean-Claude Tshisekedi, mobilisation against a possible constitutional amendment, pay disputes in the civil service and health sector, and ongoing questions about the effectiveness of security policy. The restoration of diplomatic relations between Belgium and Rwanda on 22 September 2026 is also an important variable in the regional environment. This article examines how these developments interact and what they imply for political legitimacy, institutional accountability and political stability. It argues that a crisis of confidence cannot be assessed on media controversy alone; it must be analysed in light of the outcomes of public action, judicial independence, respect for fundamental freedoms, and the State’s ability to provide security and ensure the regular functioning of public services.

Keywords: Democratic Republic of the Congo; Félix Tshisekedi; public governance; institutional accountability; public funds; political opposition; Constitution; insecurity; Belgium; Rwanda; political legitimacy.

Introduction: a government confronted with converging crises

A State's governance is not measured solely by the length of its leaders’ terms in office, the proliferation of political announcements, or a majority's ability to retain control of institutions. It must also be assessed by citizens’ security, transparency in public management, the functioning of essential services, and respect for constitutional freedoms. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), these criteria matter especially because of the territory's size, the fragility of certain institutions, and the persistence of armed conflict in the East. A United Nations Secretary-General report, S/2026/256, highlights the persistence of regional tensions despite diplomatic commitments made in support of peace [1].

Against this background, whether a “great disclosure” has begun under the presidency of Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi requires an approach that goes beyond partisan reactions. On 14 October 2026, Belgian authorities carried out searches as part of an investigation into suspected corruption, money laundering, misappropriation, and other financial offences involving several people close to the Congolese Head of State. However, the existence of an investigation and the conduct of searches do not prejudge either the guilt of those concerned or the outcome of the proceedings [2].

The central question of this study is therefore the following: does the convergence of judicial controversies, social grievances, the security crisis and constitutional tensions reveal a structural crisis of governance in the DRC, or does it reflect a succession of political conflicts whose outcome will depend on the capacity of institutions to establish the facts and respond to public expectations? The analysis draws on the concepts of public accountability, political legitimacy, institutional oversight and human security. It draws on identifiable journalistic sources, official documents, and publications by international organisations.

I. Searches in Belgium: a judicial case that became a diplomatic issue

The searches carried out on 14 October 2026 in Brussels and several municipalities in Walloon and Flemish Brabant are among the most significant events in the recent political sequence. According to Le Monde, they form part of an investigation opened following a complaint lodged on 8 July 2025 by civil-society organisations from Greater Katanga and former Gécamines officials. The allegations concern, among other things, suspected corruption, misappropriation of funds, money laundering and financial irregularities linked to the exploitation of mineral resources. The proceedings cite several members of the presidential family [2].

The case quickly moved beyond a strictly judicial framework. After the operations, First Lady Denise Nyakeru Tshisekedi rejected the allegations against her. The Congolese President asked government members to suspend contact with the Belgian Embassy in the DRC, while Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot defended maintaining diplomatic channels [2]. This sequence illustrates how judicial proceedings concerning identified individuals can produce inter-State effects when they involve the immediate entourage of a Head of State.

From an institutional standpoint, the significance of the “great disclosure” will depend less on the political impact of the searches than on the verifiable results of the investigation. A scientific analysis must therefore distinguish four levels: the allegations made by complainants, investigative acts carried out by the judicial authorities, the responses of the persons concerned and, finally, any judicial decisions that may follow.

II. The President’s elder brother speaks out: a symbolic repudiation of the political record?

The controversy took on a new dimension with public criticism from Jean-Claude Mulumba Tshisekedi, the President’s elder brother. According to Eco24, he denounced a departure from the political ideals defended by Étienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba and summarised his criticism with the claim that “the people first” had become “the mining block first” [3].

This intervention is politically significant because it comes from a member of the presidential family who invokes the legacy of the UDPS's historic founder. It does not, however, constitute evidence of financial irregularities. Its analytical interest lies in the contrast it stages between a political legacy centred on giving priority to citizens and an assessment of the government’s record. To measure this gap, analysis must turn to objectifiable indicators: access to public services, regularity of remuneration, quality of infrastructure, effectiveness of oversight mechanisms and the State’s capacity to account for the use of public resources.

III. Public funds and the accountability of political leaders

The misappropriation of public funds is a central issue in Congolese governance. The State's credibility depends on its ability to protect collective resources, oversee budget execution, and sanction established offences. In this respect, recent judicial developments provide an example distinct from the Belgian case: on 18 September 2026, the Court of Cassation sentenced former Justice Minister Constant Mutamba to ten years’ hard labour in the case concerning the Special Fund for Reparation and Compensation for Victims of Uganda’s Unlawful Activities in the DRC (FRIVAO); the Fund’s former acting coordinator, Chançard Bolukola, was also convicted [4].

The analysis of such cases should not be confined to identifying individual responsibility. It must also examine the mechanisms that make irregularities possible: weak internal controls, insufficient traceability of expenditure, opacity in procurement procedures and limitations in parliamentary scrutiny. The issue becomes even more sensitive when disputes involving substantial sums coexist with delays in paying some public-sector employees.

IV. Insecurity in the East: sovereignty tested by facts on the ground

Persistent insecurity in eastern DRC remains one of the principal challenges facing the Congolese State. The United Nations Secretary-General's report S/2026/256 notes that, despite diplomatic initiatives, the security situation remains fragile, and tensions between regional actors continue to weigh on implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework [1].

The security crisis also requires reflection on the State’s ability to coordinate the armed forces, intelligence services, territorial authorities and civilian oversight mechanisms. Its consequences go beyond the military dimension: population displacement, economic disruption, difficulties accessing education and healthcare, contracting trade, and increasing pressure on public finances.

V. The Congolese army: command, pay and institutional coherence

Questions about senior officers, assignment changes, new military units, and remuneration difficulties must be examined cautiously. In a context of prolonged conflict, command decisions and force reorganisation may respond to legitimate operational requirements, but they may also raise questions about institutional cohesion, the reliability of chains of command and the quality of oversight procedures.

In particular, the arrest or prosecution of certain officers should not automatically be taken as proof of widespread infiltration of the military apparatus. Such a conclusion would require systematic evidence. However, suspicions, individual cases, or breaches of loyalty are sufficient to justify stronger vetting, counter-intelligence, disciplinary, and internal-control mechanisms.

VI. Political opposition and the Force du progrès: the right to demonstrate tested by violence

Demonstrations organised against a proposed constitutional amendment highlighted tensions between political forces and the institutions responsible for maintaining public order. Human Rights Watch documented the use of excessive force against demonstrators gathered in Kinshasa on 12 June 2026 and also reported violence involving members of the Force du progrès, a group linked to the main governing party, as well as arrests [5].

These events raise a classic public-law question: how can the maintenance of public order and the protection of public safety be reconciled with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of assembly? The answer depends less on the respective political legitimacy of the opposing camps than on compliance, by both public authorities and party actors, with the requirements of necessity, proportionality and accountability.

VII. The Constitution and the future of power: the debate over political alternation

The constitutional question is increasingly central to relations between the government and the opposition. On 25 October 2026, several media outlets reported remarks Félix Tshisekedi made before elected representatives of the Union sacrée, in which he said he would stop in 2028 if his political family refused to amend the Constitution [6]. The Congolese Constitution determines the length and number of presidential terms, and Article 220 excludes certain fundamental provisions from amendment, including those concerning the duration and number of presidential terms [7].

The debate therefore concerns not only the political desirability of reform, but also its legal limits. In a constitutional State, any amendment to the fundamental law must be assessed against amendment procedures, entrenched clauses, and the principle of political alternation.

VIII. Strikes and unpaid public employees: social malaise as an indicator of governance

The administration's regular functioning is a direct indicator of State capacity. On 20 October 2026, the Inter-Union Committee of Kinshasa’s urban public administration announced a strike action over, among other issues, salary arrears, formal inclusion on payrolls, and the alignment of serving employees who were not being paid [8]. In the health sector, the Inter-Union Committee also issued a strike notice on 30 September over salary and administrative demands [9].

These tensions do not, by themselves, demonstrate a general crisis of the State. They nevertheless indicate institutional vulnerability, because regular pay, predictable administrative careers, and continuity of public services directly contribute to confidence in institutions.

IX. Belgium-Rwanda: a diplomatic realignment with regional consequences

The restoration of diplomatic relations between Belgium and Rwanda, announced on 22 September 2026, constitutes a notable change in the DRC’s regional environment [10]. However, it would be excessive to infer from this that Brussels has abandoned Kinshasa: in its official statement, Belgium explicitly affirmed that resuming dialogue with Kigali did not mean relinquishing its positions and that it would continue to defend the DRC's territorial integrity and sovereignty [10].

For Kinshasa, the issue is therefore less about interpreting this normalisation as an automatic alignment than about assessing its consequences for mediation processes, diplomatic balances of power, and the conditions under which regional commitments are implemented.

X. A crisis of confidence or an accumulation of controversies?

Taken together, the events examined above reveal several centres of tension: judicial proceedings, criticism from within the presidential family, disputes over public management, salary claims, persistent insecurity, and a polarised constitutional debate. Taken separately, none of these elements is sufficient to establish a general institutional crisis. Taken together, they may nevertheless have a cumulative effect on political confidence.

This sequence was compounded in October 2026 when former President Joseph Kabila took leadership of the Front pour la refondation de la nation (FRN), a politico-military movement presented as the successor to the AFC/M23. This development reconfigures the balance of power in the East and increases national political uncertainty [11]. It does not, however, provide a scientific basis for concluding that a deliberate strategy of “Sudanisation” is underway without further empirical evidence.

The concept of a crisis of confidence therefore seems more precise than institutional collapse. It refers to a situation in which a combination of unmet expectations, public controversy, and uncertainty about the authorities’ ability to produce verifiable results puts institutional legitimacy under pressure.

Conclusion: the real disclosure will be the disclosure of facts

The question of whether a “great disclosure” has begun under the presidency of Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi calls for a nuanced answer. The events of 2026 have unquestionably increased the visibility of governance, public accountability, and legitimacy issues. They do not, however, justify conflating allegations, investigations, convictions, and political responsibility.

The decisive test lies in institutions' ability to establish verifiable facts and provide legally credible responses. In this respect, territorial security, the functioning of the justice system, respect for public freedoms, regular payment of State employees, transparency in financial management, and observance of constitutional rules are all indicators of the real solidity of political power.

The “out of the game” formulation used in the title therefore cannot be presented scientifically as an established state of affairs. It must be understood as a political hypothesis to be tested against institutions, the results of public action and the law.

Bibliographic and documentary references

[1] United Nations, Secretary-General, Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, report S/2026/256, 31 March 2026.

[2] Le Bourdon, Alix, “Entre la RDC et la Belgique, des tensions après des perquisitions menées dans la famille du président congolais”, Le Monde, 17 October 2026, updated 19 October 2026.

[3] Eco24, “RDC : le frère aîné de FATSHI dénonce la trahison du testament politique d’Étienne Tshisekedi : ‘le peuple d’abord, est devenu le carré minier d’abord’”, 20 October 2026.

[4] Agence congolaise de presse (ACP), “Procès FRIVAO : l’ancien ministre Constant Mutamba condamné à 10 ans de travaux forcés”, 18 September 2026.

[5] Human Rights Watch, “RD Congo : Répression à l’encontre de manifestants”, 9 July 2026.

[6] Enquete.cd, “RDC : ‘Si, en 2028, vous refusez, je m’arrête là’, prévient Félix Tshisekedi”, 25 October 2026.

[7] Democratic Republic of the Congo, Constitution of 18 February 2006, as amended, in particular Art. 220.

[8] Agence congolaise de presse (ACP), “Administration publique de Kinshasa : grève mercredi pour réclamer les arriérés de salaire”, 20 October 2026.

[9] Agence congolaise de presse (ACP), “RDC : l’intersyndicale du secteur santé lance un préavis de grève de sept jours”, 30 September 2026.

[10] Kingdom of Belgium, FPS Foreign Affairs, “Belgium and Rwanda restore diplomatic relations”, 22 September 2026.

[11] Le Cam, Morgane, “En RDC, l’ancien président Joseph Kabila prend la tête des rebelles de l’Est”, Le Monde, 13 October 2026, updated 14 October 2026.

[12] Radio Okapi, “Joseph Kabila à la tête du mouvement politico-militaire FRN, qui succède à l’AFC/M23”, 13 October 2026.

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